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Computational modellers are not always explicit about their motivations for constructing mod-
els, nor are they always explicit about the theoretical implications of their models once con-
structed. Perhaps in part due to this, models have been criticised as “black-box” exercises
which can play little or no role in scientific explanation. This paper argues that models are
useful, and that the motivations for constructing computational models can be made clear by
considering the roles that tautologies can play in the development of explanatory theories.
From this, additionally, I propose that although there are diverse benefits of model building,
only one class of benefits — those which relate to explanation — can provide justification for
the activity.
What use are models?
What kind of object are computational models, and how
are they scientifically useful? Among the modelling commu-
nity there is little in depth discussion of these issues. This is
partly, we may suppose, because among the converted there
is little need to rehearse doctrine. But even in textbooks the
philosophical status of modelling per se takes second place
to details of specific models and some introductory discus-
sion of specific issues such as level of representation. (Ellis
& Humphreys, 1999; Elman, 1996; O’Reilly & Munakata,
2000) This can give the impression that the nature of mod-
elling with regard to scientific explanation is well under-
stood. As modellers we know that models are useful; in-
deed, our work is based on this assumption. However, not
everyone shares this feeling, nor agrees with this position.
In fact there have been sustained debates over the proper use
and purposes of modelling. (Lewandowsky, 1993; Roberts &
Pashler, 2000; Smolensky, 1988)
One point of contention, which this article will use as
a starting point, is that computational models (henceforth
’models’) are defined in mathematical terms and so can ap-
pear to share with mathematics the property of being tau-
tological. This has led some to suggest that models cannot
tell us anything new about the world. (Segalowitz & Bern-
stein, 1997). Models, it is claimed, can make predictions
but this is their only role in the scientific process. They can-
not ever be part of a “test of how humans actually work”
nor can they “provide new information about brain organi-
sation or function” (Segalowitz & Bernstein, 1997). An im-
portant related idea is that computational models can be un-
interpretable black boxes — a-theoretical objects which may
match human performance or structure but which do not pro-
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vide any additional information, precisely because a model
could have been built which would match any pattern of data,
not just this specific one. (McCloskey, 1991). The claim is
that, because the workings of a model are unintepretable or
irrelevant to psychology or neuroscience, their only use is
to make predictions which can be compared to psychology
or neuroscience. Models, in this view, are in no way analo-
gous to real theories of psychology or neuroscience (which
are verbally or logically defined).
Beyond this, there has also been criticism of the ‘glam-
our’ of computational modelling. Nobel laureate Francis
Crick was extremely sceptical of the early Parallel Dis-
tributed Processing (D. Rumelhart, McClelland, & the PDP
Research Group, 1986) movement:
“I also suspect that within most modellers a
frustrated mathematician is trying to unfold his
wings. It is not enough to make something
that works. How much better if it can be
shown to embody some powerful general prin-
ciple for handling information, expressible in a
deep mathematical form, if only to give an air of
intellectual respectability to an otherwise rather
low-brow enterprise.” (Crick, 1989)
The implication is that modelling persists in recruiting
practitioners and advocates because it has an air of math-
ematical rigour and complexity, while actually this dis-
guises what is no more than a kind of grubby ad-hocism —
some spur-of-the-moment engineering solutions motivated
merely by fitting the data. And, worse than this, Crick sug-
gests, modelling is a particularly non-informative kind of ad-
hocism.
Clearly the utility of modelling is not as well established
as you might suppose from attending a gathering of mod-
ellers, such as one of the Neural Computation and Psychol-
ogy Workshops, or from reading a proceedings such as this
one.
This article is underpinned by the belief that it is a lack
of understanding of the nature of models and modelling that
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leads to confusion over their scientific value. Since models
undeniably involve mathematical tautologies, and since this
tautological nature has been leveled as a criticism against
modelling, I will use the analogy of a tautology to ex-
plore the possible benefits of doing computational modelling.
Through this I hope to clarify what theoretical work mod-
elling can hope to do.
A very simple tautology
The code that runs a model can be expressed in mathemat-
ical equations, and it is mathematical element that makes a
model tautological. However, the heart of any model is the
effort to establish a correspondence between parts of the sys-
tem being modelled and the parts of the model. As Kenneth
Craik, a prescient theorist of cognitive science, said
“By model we thus mean any physical or chemi-
cal structure system which has a similar relation-
structure to that of the processes it imitates”
(Craik, 1943)
Models will necessarily be tautological with respect to
their component parts. Because it is possible to reduce a
model to a set of mathematical equations this must be true.
But our scientific interest in a model lies not merely in the
equations as such, but in the relation of the component parts
of the model to component parts of the world. Models are
formally specified by their equations, but they are also com-
prised of a set of model-world relations. Because of this they
are more than “black-boxes” and so can inform our theories
of the world in deeper and more complex ways than merely
making predictions.
As a vehicle to explore the different ways in which tau-
tology can, in fact, inform us about the world, let us begin
by taking a very simple tautology: that 1 + 2 = 3. Model
simulations only differ from this tautology in their degree of
complexity, and their consequent opacity. This article will
hope to use the very simplicity of this particular tautology to
illustrate the value of models-as-tautologies in general.
The importance of tautology
So, let us begin to consider the possible ways in which a
tautology can inform a scientific theory.
Sufficiency
The first way is the demonstration of sufficiency. Imagine
that ‘3’ in 1 + 2 = 3 is a known real-world phenomenon. The
model can demonstrate that other phenomena (‘1’ and ‘2’)
and known causal laws (‘+’) are sufficient to produce it.
Whether or not this is interesting theoretical work depends
on the current beliefs of theorists about how ‘3’ arises. When
the existence of the result (‘3’) is uncontroversial but the in-
gredients are uncertain, we have provided a theoretical op-
tion, a possibility - the status of which depends on research
into whether the ingredients exist, and on the number of other
candidate theories there are for producing this result. An
example of this kind of work is Linsker’s (1988) demon-
stration that self-organisation according to the Hebb rule can
produce cells with receptive field properties like those found
in the visual system. This model does not tell us whether
the modelled dynamics actually are responsible for the re-
ceptive field properties of visual system neurons. It merely
demonstrates rigourously that this possibility exists, and con-
sequently, raises our assessment of the likelihood of this hy-
pothesis being true.
Prediction
If the presence of the ingredient elements (‘1 + 2’) is un-
controversial but the result (‘3’) is either not known or not
commonly associated with these ingredients, then the model
makes a prediction: that the result element will arise from
the ingredients. An example of this is McClelland & Rumel-
hart’s (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981) predictions concern-
ing the effect of word context on letter recognition. These
predictions were experimentally confirmed by Rumelhart &
McClelland. (D. E. Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) This
ability to make predictions which can be confirmed or falsi-
fied is obviously a core part of the scientific process (Popper,
1968), and is often offered as a major motivation for build-
ing models. The issue is discussed further below in relation
to the desirability of cumulative modelling programmes.
Existence proof
Even if all the elements in the models are uncontrover-
sial, then modelling can still provide an informative result by
establishing a possible connection between the ingredients
and the results. This is a variety of what is known as an
existence proof. An example is Plaut & Shallice’s (Plaut &
Shallice, 1993) demonstration that attractor dynamics in the
orthography-semantics mapping can produce the pattern of
errors found in patients with deep dyslexia. The existence of
attractor dynamics is not controversial, nor is the pattern of
errors found in deep dyslexics. What the model established
was that attractor dynamics could be the source of the pat-
tern of errors, a possibility that was hitherto not regarded as
a plausible hypothesis.
An existence proof style model does nor prove what is
happening, merely what could be happening. Once an exis-
tence proof is offered the processes which do in fact cause
some result still need to be investigated. How scientifically
interesting an existence proof is depends on the current opin-
ion about the mechanism illustrated. If it is controversial or
novel the model is obviously more interesting.
Insufficiency
Equally useful, but less common than the purposes dis-
cussed above, is the demonstration of insufficiency. Consider
again our tautology ‘1 + 2 = 3’. An implication of this tau-
tology is that ‘1 + 2’ equals 3 and no more than 3. In the
case that some other result (‘4’) is known to exist, the model
demonstrates the insufficiency of the hypothesized ingredi-
ents to produce it, and thus provokes a search for the addi-
tional factor which must be present, given that the ingredient
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elements have been shown to be insufficient alone. An apoc-
ryphal example (perhaps arising from Hurlbert & Poggio,
1988) is the story told of AI pioneer Marvin Minksy assign-
ing ‘vision’ to a graduate student as a summer project. The
point of the story is to illustrate how mistaken the scientific
community was about the difficulty of vision as a problem.
It was through a generation of researchers in AI attempting
to build models which could recognise what they saw, and
thus discovering that all known methods were insufficient to
achieve this, that it was realised how hard the problem of
vision really is. The demonstration of insufficiency is also
important in establishing what results would contradict or
falsify a model. (Roberts & Pashler, 2000).
Models as theories, theories as
explanations
The above framework should make clear that the impor-
tance of models resides not in their formal structure alone,
but in their purported correspondence to certain features of
the world. The usefulness of a model lies in how it informs
us about the potential relationships between features of the
world.
An informal survey of modelling work presented at the
11th Neural Computation and Psychology Workshop (Ox-
ford, July 2008) suggests that the most common purpose for
which models are constructed — or at least the most com-
mon justification offered for their construction which falls
within the current framework — is that of sufficiency: the
demonstration that a certain set of ingredients is capable of
producing a certain outcome. A danger of this kind of work is
that, as previously noted, models may, if insufficiently con-
strained, match any possible outcome. Roberts & Pashler
(Roberts & Pashler, 2000) have argued convincingly that the
value of a model can only truly be assessed when that data
which is cannot fit is also made clear. This relates to the idea
of insufficiency in the current article.
This framework also helps draw out why realism per se
is not the only metric on which models should be compared.
The virtue of a model lies not in the number of biological
details it contains, as such, but rather in its accuracy of corre-
spondence with phenomenon at the level of description that it
is trying to model. Indeed, one core motivation for modelling
in the first place is to develop useful abstractions. Al Wil-
hite (personal communication) made this point eloquently
by modifying a quote from Guy de Maupassant’s essay ‘The
Novel’, replacing the word ‘artist’ with that of ‘theorist’:
“The [theorist] will endeavour not to show us a
commonplace photograph of life, but to give us a
presentment of it which shall be more complete,
more striking, more cogent than reality itself. To
tell everything is out of the question”
It is for this reason that more details are not necessarily
better; sometimes models can be improved by including less
detail rather than more. This point is a fundamental one when
considering the choice between competing theories, going
back to William of Ockham (c. 1288 - c. 1348), through
to modern information theoretic formulations of criteria for
model comparison (for an introduction, see chapter 28 of
MacKay, 2003). Nonetheless it is a point that still needs to
be made concerning the modelling of cognition (Dror & Gal-
logly, 1999). Obviously readers will have their own beliefs
about the difficulties and benefits of modelling at different
levels of description. There is a strong case to make that since
one great strength of computational modelling is to connect
psychological and neuroscientific levels of explanation, more
biological detail will frequently yield models with greater ex-
planatory powers, but this debate is beyond the scope of the
current article.
If we accept that models are more than their mathematical
constitution and are also comprised of assertions about the
correspondence between their parts and the world, then we
must acknowledge that models are more than mere black-
boxes. In fact, models are theoretical entities, albeit with
more formal constraints and distractions that verbally spec-
ified theories, and with the proviso that models are under-
determined by theories (analogously to the way that theories
are underdetermined by data — any theory will have a fam-
ily of modelling implementations). By making connections
between known and proposed entities, models do the work of
theories. If this is accepted then, like theories, models pro-
vide explanations. Furthermore their explanation-providing
capacity is inextricably linked to their tautological nature.
There are deep and sustained issues concerning the phi-
losophy of explanation. (Mayes, 2008) The framework above
is an attempt to illustrate the important theoretical work that
can be done by models as tautologies. A similar, but far more
thorough, exposition of the importance of this kind of work
has been done by Kulka (2001; 1995) in relation to non-
computational theories in psychology, using the terms ‘the-
ory amplification’ (discovering necessary predictions, incon-
sistencies, complementarities and postdictions between the-
ories and data) and ‘simplification’ (the application of differ-
ent kinds of parsimony).
A proposal
There are other benefits of modelling beyond this frame-
work suggested by the consideration of models as tautolo-
gies. Modelling allows us to work with quantitative and mul-
ticausitive theories beyond the vague intimations of descrip-
tive theories. Models can help us define a problem (Marr,
1982) or allow us to integrate different, even conflicting, the-
ories at different levels of description within the same frame-
work. Finally, models have considerable value for cultivat-
ing the intuitions of individual researchers. As Paul Krugman
said, “We just don’t see what we can’t formalize”. (Krugman,
1993) For many modellers a primary value of modelling is
the challenge to and cultivation of their intuitions that they
make possible.
Notwithstanding these other benefits, I propose that mod-
elling as an activity is only really justified by its relation to
explanation. Because of this, the value of a model is tied
to its structure as a tautology that corresponds to the known
facts about the world, as outlined above.
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Although there are diverse benefits of modelling, unless
the driving purpose of a model is one of seeking to discover
the implications of a theory (prediction) or to promote an
explanation of some features of the world (sufficiency, insuf-
ficiency and existence proofs) then the modelling risks be-
coming a sterile exercise. Although models have a role in
cultivating our intuitions, this must be taken beyond the level
of the individual researcher and tested in the dissemination
and contestation of the model by the scientific community.
Precisely because models are tautologies, the equations
that comprise them don’t have intrinsic meaning. It is not
unambiguous which features of a set of equations that com-
prises a model are relevant to the theoretical issue at hand. In-
stead, the meaning of the model is created by the researchers
who construct the model in their attempt to persuade oth-
ers of their findings. When communicating their model and
the implications which they derive from it, the obligation is
upon the modeller to define which features of the model are
supposed to correspond to which features of the world, and
what the purposes of constructing a model like this are. Only
when a proposal about the theoretical content of the model is
offered can the value of the model be evaluated.
A good model is defined by the purposes you have; by
whether you set out to deduce the consequences of the ex-
istence of certain entities to generate predictions, to test a
proposal, prove necessity, sufficiency or insufficiency, or
‘merely’ to develop a formal framework for a problem. If
the purposes of a model are not explicitly stated then its
success and utility cannot easily be evaluated. Without a
means by which the success of a model can be evaluated it
will be difficult to integrate model findings in to a progres-
sive programme of model development, something which
is necessary for modelling to mature into a mature tech-
nique. (Roelofs, 2005)
Conclusions
Starting with the accusation that models are merely tau-
tologies, I have attempted to turn this accusation around and
argue that models can be informative about the world, but
only when the correspondences between their parts is care-
fully articulated. I have used the analogy of a tautology to
suggest a framework for some of the benefits of modelling
with relation to explanation. There remains a strict sense
in which modelling does not provide ‘new facts’ about the
world, but for this to remain a criticism relies on both an
unrealistic view of the reliability of the facts of psychology
and neuroscience as provided by other tools of the scientific
method (Feyerabend, 1988) and on an overly conservative
definition of what a ‘new fact’ is. If I use an equation to
calculate the size of the earth from the length of a shadow at
a particular spot at a particular time then I would say that I
have discovered a new fact, even though this fact — the size
of the earth — was inherent in the old facts of shadow length,
time and position and nothing was added but the tautology of
an equation.
This framework I have tried to outline of the benefits of
modelling is not supposed to be comprehensive, but it does,
I suggest, capture the core benefits of modelling, which are
those relating to explanation. It is in these ways that mod-
elling can help confirm, create, enhance or refute theories.
Models aid explanation in the same way as mathematics: by
enhancing our perception beyond the horizon of individual
reason and intuition.
References
Craik, K. J. W. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Crick, F. (1989). The recent excitement about neural networks.
Nature, 337(6203), 129-132.
Dror, I. E., & Gallogly, D. P. (1999). Computational analyses in
cognitive neuroscience: In defense of biological implausibility.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6(2), 173-182.
Ellis, R., & Humphreys, G. (1999). Connectionist psychology : a
text with readings. Hove, UK: Psychology Press Ltd.
Elman, J. L. (1996). Rethinking innateness: A connectionist per-
spective on development. MIT Press.
Feyerabend, P. (1988). Against method (revised edition). New York:
Verso.
Hurlbert, A., & Poggio, T. (1988). Making machines (and artificial
intelligence) see. Daedalus, 117(1).
Krugman, P. (1993). How I work. In the unofficial paul krugman
archive. www.pkarchive.org accessed 1/7/08.
Kukla, A. (1995). Amplification and simplification as modes of
theoretical analysis in psychology. New Ideas in Psychology,
13, 201-217.
Kulka, A. (2001). Methods of theoretical psychology. Cambridge,
MA.: MIT Press.
Lewandowsky, S. (1993). The rewards and hazards of computer-
simulations. Psychological Science, 4(4), 236-243.
Linsker, R. (1988). Self-organization in a perceptual network. Com-
puter, 21, 105-117.
MacKay, D. J. C. (2003). Information theory, inference and learn-
ing algorithms. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the hu-
man representation and processing of visual information. Henry
Holt and Co., Inc. New York, NY, USA.
Mayes, G. (2008). Theories of explanation. In The internet ency-
clopedia of philosophy. www.iep.utm.edu accessed 1/7/08.
McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1981). An interactive ac-
tivation model of context effects in letter perception: Part 1. an
account of basic findings. Psychological Review, 88, 375-407.
McCloskey, M. (1991). Networks and theories - the place of con-
nectionism in cognitive science. Psychological Science, 2(6),
387-395.
O’Reilly, R. C., & Munakata, Y. (2000). Computational explo-
rations in cognitive neuroscience: Understanding the mind by
simulating the brain. MIT Press.
Plaut, D. C., & Shallice, T. (1993). Deep dyslexia - a case-study
of connectionist neuropsychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology,
10(5), 377-500.
Popper, K. (1968). The logic of scientific discovery. London:
Hutchinson.
Roberts, S., & Pashler, H. (2000). How persuasive is a good fit? a
comment on theory testing. Psychological Review, 107(2), 358-
367.
Roelofs, A. (2005). From Popper to Lakatos: A case for cumulative
computational modeling. In A.Cutler (Ed.), Twenty-first century
psycholinguistics: Four cornerstones (Vol. 313-330). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
WHAT USE ARE COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES? 5
Rumelhart, D., McClelland, J., & the PDP Research Group. (1986).
Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstruc-
ture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. (1982). An interactive ac-
tivation model of context effects in letter perception: Part 2. the
contextual enhancement effect and some tests and extensions of
the model. Psychological Review, 89, 60-94.
Segalowitz, S., & Bernstein, D. (1997). Neural networks and neu-
roscience: What are connectionist simulations good for. In The
future of the cognitive revolution. Oxford University Press.
Smolensky, P. (1988). On the proper treatment of connectionism.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11(1), 1-23.
